Handbook in Economics of Matching highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. Chapters in this new release include Matching without transfers, Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Theory, The large markets case, Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Applications, Allocating students to schools: theory and empirical methods, Matching with Transfers, Matching with Transfers: Theory, Matching with Transfers: Applications, Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility, Extensions, Pre-matching investments, Matching with contracts, Matching under asymmetric information, Matching with frictions, and Dynamic Matching.
1. 1 Introduction - p. 2 2. 2 Introductory example - p. 2 3. 3 Mathematical framework: the one-dimensional case - p. 12 4. 4 Mathematical framework: the multidimensional case - p. 27 5. 5 Conclusion and discussion - p. 36 6. References - p. 39 7. Chapter 2: Matching with transfers: Applications - p. 42 8. Abstract - p. 42 9. 1 Introduction - p. 42 10. 2 Separable models - p. 45 11. 3 Computation and inference in separable models - p. 57 12. 4 Extensions of separable models - p. 61 13. 5 Applications of separable models - p. 66 14. 6 Non-separable models - p. 69 15. 7 Matching with frictions - p. 71 16. 8 Concluding remarks - p. 73 17. References - p. 79 18. Chapter 3: Matching under imperfectly transferable utility - p. 83 19. Abstract - p. 83 20. 1 Introduction - p. 83 21. 2 Pairwise bargaining sets - p. 85 22. 3 Stable matchings without heterogeneity - p. 94 23. 4 Stable matchings with heterogeneity - p. 95 24. 5 The ITU-logit model - p. 100 25. 6 Estimation - p. 104 26. 7 Remarks and discussions - p. 106 27. 8 Related literature - p. 118 28. References - p. 124 29. Chapter 4: Investment and competitive matching - p. 127 30. Abstract - p. 127 31. 1 Introduction - p. 127 32. 2 An illustrative example - p. 127 33. 3 The model - p. 134 34. 4 Ex-ante equilibrium with transferable utility - p. 146 35. 5 Ex-post equilibrium with transferable utility - p. 162 36. 6 Nontransferable utility - p. 182 37. 7 Discussion - p. 198 38. References - p. 222 39. Chapter 5: Matching with incomplete information - p. 224 40. Abstract - p. 224 41. 1 Introduction - p. 224 42. 2 Canonical matching models with incomplete information - p. 228 43. 3 A prior-free approach - p. 230 44. 4 A Bayesian approach - p. 240 45. 5 The preference revelation game approach - p. 249 46. 6 Open questions and further research - p. 252 47. References - p. 260
Handbook in Economics of Matching highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. Chapters in this new release include Matching without transfers, Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Theory, The large markets case, Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Applications, Allocating students to schools: theory and empirical methods, Matching with Transfers, Matching with Transfers: Theory, Matching with Transfers: Applications, Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility, Extensions, Pre-matching investments, Matching with contracts, Matching under asymmetric information, Matching with frictions, and Dynamic Matching.
1. 1 Introduction - p. 2 2. 2 Introductory example - p. 2 3. 3 Mathematical framework: the one-dimensional case - p. 12 4. 4 Mathematical framework: the multidimensional case - p. 27 5. 5 Conclusion and discussion - p. 36 6. References - p. 39 7. Chapter 2: Matching with transfers: Applications - p. 42 8. Abstract - p. 42 9. 1 Introduction - p. 42 10. 2 Separable models - p. 45 11. 3 Computation and inference in separable models - p. 57 12. 4 Extensions of separable models - p. 61 13. 5 Applications of separable models - p. 66 14. 6 Non-separable models - p. 69 15. 7 Matching with frictions - p. 71 16. 8 Concluding remarks - p. 73 17. References - p. 79 18. Chapter 3: Matching under imperfectly transferable utility - p. 83 19. Abstract - p. 83 20. 1 Introduction - p. 83 21. 2 Pairwise bargaining sets - p. 85 22. 3 Stable matchings without heterogeneity - p. 94 23. 4 Stable matchings with heterogeneity - p. 95 24. 5 The ITU-logit model - p. 100 25. 6 Estimation - p. 104 26. 7 Remarks and discussions - p. 106 27. 8 Related literature - p. 118 28. References - p. 124 29. Chapter 4: Investment and competitive matching - p. 127 30. Abstract - p. 127 31. 1 Introduction - p. 127 32. 2 An illustrative example - p. 127 33. 3 The model - p. 134 34. 4 Ex-ante equilibrium with transferable utility - p. 146 35. 5 Ex-post equilibrium with transferable utility - p. 162 36. 6 Nontransferable utility - p. 182 37. 7 Discussion - p. 198 38. References - p. 222 39. Chapter 5: Matching with incomplete information - p. 224 40. Abstract - p. 224 41. 1 Introduction - p. 224 42. 2 Canonical matching models with incomplete information - p. 228 43. 3 A prior-free approach - p. 230 44. 4 A Bayesian approach - p. 240 45. 5 The preference revelation game approach - p. 249 46. 6 Open questions and further research - p. 252 47. References - p. 260
